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Ibarra vs. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 70 (Sept. 13, 2018) (en banc)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: LARCENY FROM THE PERSON 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined a defendant can be convicted of larceny from the person when a 
defendant fraudulently persuades a person to temporarily hand over their property, when in fact 
the defendant intends to permanently take the person’s property without the person’s consent for 
purposes of NRS 205.270(1).  
 
Background 
 
I. 
 Around 3 a.m, appellant Gabriel Ibarra approached the victim, E.M., at a Las Vegas bus 
stop. Ibarra asked E.M. where she was from and what type of cell phone she had. After E.M. 
responded, Ibarra asked if he could use E.M.’s phone to make a call. E.M. hesitated but offered 
her phone to Ibarra. Ibarra grabbed E.M.’s phone and stood up to walk away. When E.M stood up 
to continue to be close to her phone, Ibarra ran.  
 The phone was later tracked down and Ibarra was arrested. E.M. valued her iPhone at $500. 
Stealing property worth less than $650 is petit larceny, a misdemeanor.2  Stealing property worth 
less than $3,500 under circumstances amounting to larceny from the person, by contrast, is a 
category C felony.3 The State charged Ibarra with larceny from the person.  
At trial, Ibarra defended the charge on the ground that he may have committed larceny, but 
he did not commit larceny from the person because E.M. voluntarily handed Ibarra her phone, thus 
Ibarra did not take the phone without her consent or by an invasion of her privacy. The verdict 
form provided the jury the choice of finding Ibarra not guilty, guilty of petit larceny, or guilty of 
larceny from the person. The jury found Ibarra guilty of larceny from the person. Ibarra timely 
appealed. In a split decision, the court of appeals vacated Ibarra’s conviction because the evidence 
did not establish the elements required for the crime of larceny from the person. The State 
petitioned for review, which the Court granted.  
 
Discussion 
 
II. 
A. 
In Nevada, the crime of larceny from the person is defined as follows:  
 
(1) A person who, under the circumstances not amounting to robbery, with 
the intent to steal or appropriate to his or her own use, takes property from the 
person of another, without the other person’s consent, is guilty of: 
 
                                                 
1  By Whitney Jones. 
2  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.240 (2017). 
3  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.270(1)(a) (2017) 
(a) If the value of the property taken is less than $35,000, a category C 
felony and shall be punished as provided in NRS 193.130[.]4 
 
On appeal, Ibarra maintained he did not take the phone from the person of another, without 
her consent so the State failed to prove its case. First, Ibarra argued that since E.M. gave him 
permission to use her phone and handed the phone to him, Ibarra did not take the phone without 
her consent. Second, Ibarra argued that he did not take the phone from E.M.’s person in accordance 
to how the Court has interpreted the elements of the crime in Terral v. State.5 The Court held that 
the evidence supported Ibarra’s conviction and affirmed the district court’s decision.  
 
B. 
 Ibarra first argued that because E.M. voluntarily handed over her phone, he did not take it 
from E.M.’s person, without her consent. The Court disagreed. NRS 205.270 does not define what 
it means to take a person’s property “without the persons consent.”6 Thus, to define “without the 
other person’s consent,” the Court looked to how the common law approached lack of consent in 
the context of larceny.  
At common law, “larceny is committed only when the aim of the thief is to divest the owner 
of his ownership, in distention from the mere use or temporary possession; so that a consent which 
comes short of this necessary intent does not cover the whole ground of the taking, and avails 
nothing.”7 The Court concluded that E.M. agreed to let Ibarra use her phone to make a call. E.M 
did not agree to Ibarra taking her phone permanently. This mismatch of intentions renders the 
taking to have occurred without E.M.’s consent.  
 Also, Ibarra’s fraud in telling E.M. he only wanted to use the phone briefly when in fact he 
intended to steal the phone, is another reason the Court concluded that the common law would 
deem the taking not to be consented to by E.M. By 1860, the principle that fraudulently obtaining 
permission to-use does not equal consent-to-take for purposes of larceny was well established.8 
This principle still is in use today through larceny by trick. Larceny by trick occurs “when a 
defendant, with the intent permanently to deprive, obtained the personal property of another by 
fraudulently inducing such other person to part with its possession.”9 In Nevada, larceny by trick 
is not a separate and distinct statutory offense. Instead, the larceny offenses Nevada does 
recognize, encompasses larceny by trick.10 Therefore, Ibarra fraudulently obtaining permission to 
use E.M.’s phone did not give Ibarra consent-to-take for purpose of larceny in Nevada. 
 The Court thus notes that because larceny from the person is the crime of larceny with an 
additional element of taking from the victim’s person, it follows that what negates consent for 
ordinary larceny also negates consent for larceny from the person. The Court therefore held Ibarra, 
who through fraud, persuaded E.M. to let him use her property temporarily while intending to steal 
her property permanently, took E.M.’s property without her consent for purposes of NRS 
205.270(1).  
 
                                                 
4  Id. § 205.270. 
5  Terral v. State, 84 Nev. 412, 442 P.2d 465 (1968).  
6  See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.270. 
7  2 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law § 813, at 451 (6th ed. 1877) (footnote omitted).  
8  State v. Humphry, 32 Vt. 569, 571–72 (1860). 
9  3 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 342, at 350 (15th ed. 1995). 
10  See NRS 205.0833 (titled “theft constitutes single offense embracing certain separate offenses…”); NRS 205.220 
(grand larceny); NRS 205.240 (petit larceny). 
C. 
Second, Ibarra argued that because E.M. handed him her phone, the taking did not occur 
until he ran off with her phone, so he did not take the phone from the person of another according 
to the Court’s holding in Terral.11 The Court disagreed. In Terral, the Court held that the property 
taken from the victim’s presence did satisfy the elements of larceny from the person.12 However, 
here, unlike in Terral, where the victim elected to set his tokens on a craps table instead of keeping 
them on his person, Ibarra separated E.M.’s phone from her person wrongfully. The Court 
determined that the circumstances here posed a threat of a violent confrontation and injury to the 
victim as – and perhaps more than – other cases sustaining a larceny from a person charge.13 
Additionally, the Court reviewed the current majority view that “from the person” includes the 
area within a victim’s immediate presence.14 The Court determined that Ibarra secured the 
dominion over the phone when he grabbed it from E.M.’s hand intending to steal it, not later, when 
he ran off with the phone. 
 
D. 
Last, Ibarra argued that Terral interpreted NRS 205.270 as requiring an additional element 
not articulated in the statute’s plain language: invasion of privacy.15 The Court disagreed. Ibarra 
claimed that he did not invade E.M.’s privacy when he tricked E.M. into giving him her phone; 
thus, the State did not prove all of the elements of larceny from a person. The Court determined 
that Terral did not impose an additional element of invasion of privacy to the crime of larceny 
from the person. Instead, Terral identified what distinguishes larceny from the person from 
ordinary larceny and justifies its felony status is that the act of taking from the person of another 
violates and directly invades that person’s privacy. Thus, the Court concluded that Terral did not 
impose an additional element as Ibarra argues.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court held there was sufficient evidence to support Ibarra’s conviction. Accordingly, 
the Court affirmed the district court’s decision. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11  Terral v. State, 84 Nev. 412, 442 P.2d 465 (1968). 
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